In the Superior Court for Yavapai County Arizona
vs. Benjamin Robert Taylor, Defendant | ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) | Case No. 2005030003J Case No. 2005-0256 CR Rule 26.10 - b (1) STATEMENT |
Statement of Defendant at Time of Sentencing:
Comes now, Benjamin Robert Taylor, the defendant in the above-styled case(s) and, under Rule 26.10b(1), enters the following statement into public record:
The Constitution for the United States of America clearly states the source of sovereignty in our nation with the first words of the Preamble: "We, the People of the United States..."
As the Constitution begins with the declaration of sovereignty, the body closes (immediately prior to the clause for ratification) in Article VI with the words: "all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States."
The first ten Amendments to the Constitution recognize, guarantee and protect my rights and my sovereign status. Failure by any sworn public servant to uphold the letter of the entire Constitution is prima facie evidence of violation of oath of office, cause for criminal and civil actions, and grounds for immediate removal from office.
I stand before this court in my proper person, under duress and by special visitation.
For the record, I have not at any time been afforded any opportunity to confront my accusers or any alleged witnesses against me, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in my favor, or been granted so much as the pretense of a presumption of innocence. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action.
All rights to due process have been categorically denied me by the combined elements of the Yavapai County Government including but not limited to the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office, the Yavapai County Attorney's Office and the Superior Court of Yavapai County. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action.
I have been denied the right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in my favor. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
I have been denied the right against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
I have been denied the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
I have been denied the right to be confronted with the witnesses against me. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
I have been denied the right to the presumption of innocence. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
I have been denied the right to assistance of councel. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
I have been denied the right to due process of law. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
I have been denied the right to just compensation. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
I have been denied the right to testify before a Grand Jury. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
I have been denied the right against excessive bail being set. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
I have been denied the right to equal protection under the law. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
I have been denied the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
I have been denied an opportunity to examine any reports prepared under Rules 26.4 and 26.5. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
I have been denied the right to express any objections to the contents of my presentence report. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
As evidenced by the multiple case numbers for these proceedings, I have been denied the right against double jeopardy. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The Superior Court of Yavapai County has removed the burden of proof of criminal intent from the prosecution in conflict with and violation of Title 18 USC, Part 1, Chapter 44, Section 924(d). This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
For my own part, there was never any intent to either break any law or cause any damage; this point was made to the arresting deputies and has been repeated ad infinitum throughout these proceedings. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The Superior Court of Yavapai County has unlawfully shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defendant in conflict with and violation of due process and the presumption of innocence. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
Elements of the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office employed improper police practice and excessive force in the course of affecting my pre-arranged arrest, bludgeoning and wrongful detention. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
Agents of the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office were not acting in good faith or in the lawful performance of their duties while affecting my pre-arranged arrest, bludgeoning and wrongful detention. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
Agents of the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office have refused to be interviewed by my legal councel regarding their participation in my pre-arranged arrest, bludgeoning and wrongful detention. This violation of the Sixth Amendment right to face my accusers is not only a violation of the deputies' oath(s) to uphold the Constitution and, therefor, grounds for immediate dismissal of the deputies from State employment, but also grounds for both criminal and civil actions against the individual deputies, the Sheriff himself and his entire Office. Under ARS 13-4073 the deputies' refusal to be interviewed automatically makes them liable [to me] for one-hundred dollars ($100.00) each. This is further cause for the immediate dismissal of this fraudulent criminal action;
Deputies of the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office were acting beyond the scope of their official authority and not in the line of duty while affecting my pre-arranged arrest, bludgeoning and wrongful detention, thereby making themselves accomplices to the crimes of their co-conspirator John Lee "Killer" Schnabel, who filed the false report upon which the deputies subsequent actions were based. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
Verifiable crimes committed by the Yavapai County Government's co-conspirator John Lee "Killer" Schnabel on my property while I was unlawfully being held captive by the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office following [Killer's] fraudulent police report, and being held on unlawfully excessive bail [set by Judge Markham at the Yavapai County Attorney's request], include but are not limited to violations of Arizona Revised Statutes 13-302, 13-1002, 13-1003, 13-1201, 13-1202, 13-1203, 13-1204, 13-1502, 13-1503, 13-1504, 13-1505, 13-1506, 13-1507, 13-1508, 13-1602, 13-1603, 13-1604, 13-1802, 13-2004, 13-2006, 13-2008, and so many other crimes and criminal activities as to be too numerous for me to afford the printer paper to print the entire list. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
Yavapai County Sheriff's Office deputies, agents of the County Attorney's Office and officers of the Superior Court of Yavapai County have made themselves principles in these crimes through facilitation (ARS 13-1004), and conspiracy (ARS 13_1003). This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
Deputies of the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office were acting in violation of Title 42 U.S.C. 1985 and 1986. See Andrade v. Jamestown Housing Authority, 82 F.3d 1179 (1st Cir, 1996) and specifically failed to prevent the execution of a discriminatory and retaliatory trespass and eviction under Title42 U.S.C. 3604, 3617; 42 U.S.C. 12203, 34-18-46, 34-37-4, 34-37-5.1. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action; 27
Deputies of the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office have perpetrated numerous color-of-law violations of Title 42, U.S.C, Section 14141, Title 42, U.S.C, Section 1997, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title 18, U.S.C, Section 242, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability including but not limited to excessive force, false arrest/fabrication of evidence, deprivation of property, and failure to keep from harm. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
Deputies of the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office conspired to violate Title 42, U.S.C, Section 14141 and followed through on their conspiracy in the course of this active case. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The Yavapai County Sheriff's Office has engaged in the use of torture. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
Deputies of the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office conspired to deprive me of rights secured by the constitution in violation of TITLE 18, U.S.C, Sections 241 and 242. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
Deputies of the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office have committed misdemeanor and capital crimes under the color of law and violated 42 U.S.C. Section1983. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The Yavapai County Sheriff's Office has withheld evidence in violation of the Freedom of Information Act and the Arizona Open Records Act. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The Yavapai County Sheriff's Office has destroyed evidence. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The Yavapai County Sheriff's Office has fabricated evidence. This is suficcient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The Yavapai County Sheriff's Office has falsified public record. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The Yavapai County Sheriff's Office has altogether refused to abide by the Arizona Open Records Act. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The Yavapai County Sheriff's Office has conspired to deprive me of individual rights secured by the Constitution. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action; 38
The Yavapai County Sheriff's Office has engaged in systemic derivations of the constitutional rights of institutionalized persons under Title 42, U.S.C, Section 1997. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
Deputies of the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office committed more than two-hundred (200+) individual Title II violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act between February 28 and March 30, 2005. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
Deputies of the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office deprived me of physician-prescribed medications on 120 separate instances over the designated thirty day period. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
Deputies of the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office deprived me of physician-prescribed wheelchair no less than fifteen individual times. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The Yavapai County Sheriff's Office continues to exhibit the following policies or practices which foster a pattern of misconduct:
- Lack of, or improper training of officers.
- Lack of supervision/monitoring of officers' actions.
- A citizen complaint process which treats complainants as adversaries. 45
- Officers not providing justification or not reporting incidents involving force.
Elements of the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office employed improper police practice and excessive force in the course of affecting my pre-arranged arrest, bludgeoning and wrongful detention. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The person in charge of the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office, one Steve Waugh, is accustomed to violating the laws of the United States with impunity and the likelihood of his refraining from doing so in further proceedings of this live action is negligible. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
It is a crime for one or more persons acting under color of law willfully to deprive or conspire to deprive another person of any right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Criminal acts under color of law include acts not only done by local, state, or federal officials within the bounds or limits of their lawful authority, but also acts done beyond the bounds of their lawful authority.
Color of law may include public officials who are not law enforcement officers, for example, judges and prosecutors, as well as, in some circumstances, non governmental employees who are asserting state authority, such as private security guards.
The Supreme Court has had to interpret the United States Constitution to construct law regulating the actions of those in the law enforcement community. Enforcement of these provisions does not require that any racial, religious, or other discriminatory motive existed.
I have personally witnessed elements of the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office violate Arizona Revised Statutes 13-115, 13-301, 13-302, 13-1001 A 1,2,3 and B, 13-1203, 13-1003 (A) (B) (C) and (D), 13-1004, 13-1201, 13-1204, 13-1303, 13-1304 A3 and 4, 13-1508, 13-1601, 13-1602, 13-1902-2 A, 133-1903 A, 13-1602 A 1, 2 and 3, 13-1603 A 1, 13-1604 13-1802 and 13-2006(A) (3). This is more than sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
A veritable plethora of acts committed by bonafide agents of the Yavapai County Government, as described in this Statement, meet all requirements for criminal liability under ARS 13-201. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
I have seen evidence which would lead a reasonable person to believe they could be prevented or hindered from receiving full, fair, impartial hearings or the full, fair, impartial administration of justice. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The Yavapai County Attorney has wholly avoided any pretense of attempting to meet the state-of-mind requirements of ARS 13-202 (A). This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The Yavapai County Attorney has altogether failed to establish any preponderance of evidence that might suggest any criminal offenses have actually taken place. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The Yavapai County Attorney has committed an act or acts of treason against the Constitution of the United States of America. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The Yavapai County Attorney has never, at any time, pretended to fulfill the burden of proof requirements of Rule 16.2.(1)a (4)b. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The Yavapai County Attorney has prevented and hindered me from receiving full, fair, impartial hearings or the full, fair, impartial administration of justice. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The Yavapai County Attorney has actively, knowingly and wantonly withheld and destroyed evidence of justification of my own actions under ARS 13-405, 13-407, and 13-408. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The Yavapai County Attorney has withheld and destroyed further exculpatory evidence of my innocence under ARS 13-411 (A) (B) and (C), 13-412 (A) and 13-413 (A). This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The person in charge of the Yavapai County Attorney's Office, one Sheila Polk, is accustomed to violating the laws of the United States with impunity and the likelihood of her refraining from doing so in further proceedings of this live action is negligible. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
Elements within the Superior Court of Yavapai County are operating outside the laws of the United States of America in direct contradiction to and in violation of the very laws they are charged with upholding and enforcing. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
Certain orders issued by the Superior Court of Yavapai County in violation of federal laws and code are void, unenforceable and may constitute an act or acts of treason against the Constitution of the United States of America. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
In posting excessive bail under advisement from the prosecution and in violation of my right to the presumption of innocence as well as in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Title 18, USC subsections (g) and (n) of section 922, and in setting unlawful restrictions in his conditions for my release from custody, the Honorable Arthur Markham knew, or should have known, that under the Supreme Law of the Land:
"Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law, and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law." [Emphasis in original]. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 412 (7th Cir. 1972), citing Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat (22 U.S.) 738, 866, 6 L.Ed 204 (1824); U.S. v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1991).
When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid statutes expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost. Rankin v. Howard, (1980) 633 F.2d 844, cert den. Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L.Ed 2d 326.
In upholding and affirming the unconstitutional conditions of release set by Judge Markham, Judges Kiger, Stirling and Darrow knew, or should have known, that the void judgment brought before them remains void even if they did not vacate it. Judges Kiger, Stirling and Darrow knew, or should have known, that the void judgment was not affirmed nor validated by their failure to properly exercise their judicial duty. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action.
Judges Kiger, Stirling and Darrow knew, or should have known, that they had the duty, and had no discretion, to vacate void orders and judgments. These judges knew, or should have known, that they had conscientiously, arbitrarily, capriciously, deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly engaged in conduct in violation of their duty as judges, and further engaged in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land. "We [Judges] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution." [clarification added] U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821). This is far more than sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action.
Judges Markham, Kiger, Stirling and Darrow should not have engaged in treason against the Constitution, a Constitution to which they have each taken a personal oath to support.
Since judges who do not report the criminal activities of other judges become principals in the criminal activity under Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1, and since no judges have reported the criminal activity of the judge who issued orders violative of constitutional rights, the other judges are as guilty as the judge who initially issued the void orders. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action.
"Where there is no jurisdiction, there can be no discretion, for discretion is incident to jurisdiction." Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray 120, cited in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872)
Judges have no judicial immunity for criminal acts, aiding, assisting, or conniving with others who perform a criminal act, or for their administrative/ministerial duties. When a judge has a duty to act, he does not have discretion - he is then not performing a judicial act, he is performing a ministerial act.
A judge must be acting within his jurisdiction as to subject matter and person, to be entitled to immunity from civil action for his acts. Davis v. Burris, 51 Ariz. 220, 75 P.2d 689 (1938)
Judicial immunity does not exist for judges who engage in criminal activity, for judges who connive with, aid and abet the criminal activity of another judge, or to a judge for damages sustained by a person who has been harmed by the judge's connivance with, aiding and abetting, another judge's criminal activity.
When judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or they enforce a void order (an order issued by a judge without jurisdiction), they become trespassers of the law, and are engaged in treason (see below) Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
"The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law."
The above is applicable to this court by application of Article VI of the United States Constitution and Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 483 n. 35, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976).
"State courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law."
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated that "when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." [Emphasis supplied in original]. By law, a judge is a state officer. The judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual (in his person).
If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), he/she is without jurisdiction, and he/she has engaged in an act or acts of treason.
Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)
Extortion is defined in Black's Law Dictionary - 6th Edition as:
"The obtaining of property from another induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right."
Should anyone attempt to execute on the void order that Judge Markham overstepped his authority to dictate and that Judges Kiger, Stirling and Darrow had, under their judicial responsibility, a duty to vacate, or the void judgment issued by Judge Darrow in this case, then he or she will have personally aided and abetted a scheme of extortion and other criminal activity. Judge Markham and all other parties named herein will then be involved in the unlawful act of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1951.
Violations of Title 18, U.S.C, Section 241 (Conspiracy Against Rights) by combined elements of the Yavapai County Government may be construed as a Hate Crime under Federal law. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
Violations of Title 18, U.S.C, Section 245 (Interference with Federally Protected Activities) by combined elements of the Yavapai County Government may be construed as a Hate Crime under Federal law. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
Violations of Title 18, U.S.C, Section 844 (h) (Using Explosives or Fire in the Commission of a Felony) by the Yavapai County Government's co-conspirator John Lee "Killer" Schnabel may be construed as a Hate Crime under Federal law. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action; 67
Co-conspirators Acton, Alvarez, Boan, Darrow, Felker, Kiger, Markham, Moore, Polk, Sterling, Sullivan, Waugh and Zavos knew, or certainly should have known, that they had conscientiously, arbitrarily, capriciously, deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly engaged in conduct in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land, in violation of their duties under the law, in "fraud upon the court" and to aid and abet others in criminal activity, thus making themselves principals in the criminal activity. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action.
In Stump vs. Sparkman the court did rule that a judge can be sued for acts in "the absence of all judicial authority."
"So strong [was] the citizens' distrust of sitting State Court Judges in Arizona, that after Arizona copied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it added the present Rule 42(f)(1) to provide a mechanism for a litigant to permanently remove the assigned judge from the case." Joint Res. No. 8, 8/21/11, 37 U.S. Stat. 39, cited in Vol. 1, Ariz. Rev. Stats., p.130.
Any Judge who stands in the way of justice and the law is acting outside of all judicial authority and thereby waives his rights to immunity from civil liability.
My conviction, while I remain permanently confined to a wheelchair and require prescription medications six times a day, may qualify as bailable even after conviction under the exceptions clause of ARS 13-3961.01, which states, "A person shall not be continued at large on bail or be admitted to bail after conviction of a felony offense for which the person has received a sentence of imprisonment except when the superior court or a judge thereof is satisfied upon investigation that the person in custody is in such physical condition that continued confinement would endanger his life." (Emphasis added)
The prison system of the State of Arizona is presently being run under contract by the lowest competing bidder and the infirmary of each prison is likewise under the administration of the lowest competing bidder; those prescription medications which are allowed within the system are dispensed only twice daily.
Deprivation of medically prescribed medications constitutes a Title II violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act.
The 14th Amendment guarantees the fundamental rights of citizens to due process and such rights require strict scrutiny of the Court.
The State's key witness in this case is a long-term mental health patient with long and well-documented histories of psychosis, delusions and extreme violence - up to and including persistent boasts of having killed more than two hundred human beings and insisting on being called by his self-coined nickname of "Killer" - as well as a more than thirty-year addiction to morphine, an ongoing problem with methamphetamine and the usual criminal activities one normally associates with long-term drug addiction.
The State's star witness is furthermore an individual whose reputation in the community for having caused trouble and for subsequently having been evicted from very literally every residence he has ever inhabited, as well as for threats, drug dealing and retaliatory violence identical in nature to those acts that lead to his eviction from my property and the acts necessitating these proceedings. This witness is impeachable under Rule 609. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The three remaining witnesses for the State possess similarly tarnished reputations in the community as having been habitually abusive of their authority as sheriff's deputies, consistent in their use of excessive force while affecting arrests, and have been the subjects of dozens of complaints regarding police misconduct and criminal activities under the color of the law. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action.
At least one of the deputies has a history of substance abuse and domestic violence including numerous criminal charges - all of which have been summarily dismissed by the Superior Court of Yavapai County as "professional courtesy" (read: "collusion"). These witnesses are likewise impeachable under Rule 609. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
The entire Yavapai County Government is operating in a manner contrary to and in violation of the laws of the United States of America and is a Criminal Enterprise as defined by RICO - U.S. v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1531 (7th Cir. 1985) and Bracey v. Gramley, case No. 96-6133 (June 9, 1997). This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action;
Among the relevant international instruments under which personnel of the Yavapai County Government may be held liable are: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action.
Each and all of the acts with which I have been charged in [these] case[s] are justifiable and legal acts under ARS 13-411 A, B and C. The farcical pretense that any crime has been committed is a component of conspiracy designed to deprive me of family heirloom property valued at more than six-thousand dollars and to simultaneously fulfill Sheila Polk's February 2000 vow to see that I go to prison and do not come out alive. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action.
At no time has the Yavapai County Government shown that my incarceration would in any way serve the public interest of the citizens of Yavapai County, of the State of Arizona, or of the United States of America. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action.
There are, in point of fact, more than one hundred valid and legitimate points of law refferenced in this Statement - any one of which is and has been sufficient cause for this case to have been dismissed over the past fifteen months that this case has been before this court.
This court's failure and refusal to have done so poignantly demonstrates which side the court has chosen to play on.
The mere fact that any side at all has been chosen by the court itself would have been cause for any judicial officer with the merest modicum of integrity or even superficial respect for the institute and concept of justice to have recused themself.
I therefore put the Court on notice that I intend to defend my rights and to hold the Court liable for any and all acts the Court takes against me that are done in the absence of judicial authority.
I agree to abide by the judgement of this court only until such time as said judgement is reversed by a higher court not associated with the criminal enterprise known as the Yavapai Couty Government.
The bizarre nature of these proceedings has precluded any pretended adherence to Rule 26. Sentencing is therefore arbitrary and punitive. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action.
It is my understanding that the change of plea accompanying this Statement should recite that I waive my constitutional rights; I must forego any such false claim, as my rights have effectively been waived for me by the combined criminal elements of the Yavapai County Government. This is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this action.
Having witnessed firsthand the judicial abuse of discretion, judicial misconduct, malicious prosecution, vindictive prosecution, prosecutorial misconduct, abuse of process, malfeasance, misfeasance, ethics violations, fraud upon the court, civil rights violations, police misconduct and legal misconduct for which the Yavapai County Government is rightly infamous, I acquiesce to the absence of due process and vacuum of justice this court represents and beg for mercy in sentencing for whatsoever crime or crimes with which I am rightly or wrongly accused.
As Public Record, the copying, printing and free distribution of this document is highly encouraged.
In preparation for postconviction relief, I invoke Rule 26.11 b(2) and request a certified copy of the record and the reporter's transcripts up to and including the final disposition of each numbered case or incident for Incident Number 05-007570, Case No. 2005-030003J and Case No. 2005-0256 CR.
[Yours Truly & sign it "Bob God"]
_____________________________
Benjamin Robert Taylor
2150 North Windmill Way
Chino Valley, Arizona 86323
(928) 636-2666
May 22, 2006There follows a list comprised of some, but not all, of the individuals and entities with whom appropriate complaints, based in part upon the information given under oath in this Statement, have been duly filed together with unabridged copies of this Statement and other pertinent documents:
Wanna help out? cut&paste the text of this entire file into e-mails to everybody on this list! Do it as frequently as you like! Thanks from the gilded cage, bg. [Click here for e-mail list.]
The Honorable Janet Napolitano, Governor of Arizona
1700 West Washington, Phoenix, Arizona 85007 - (800) 253-0883Office of Governor Janet Napolitano, Constituent Services
1700 West Washington-101A, Phoenix, Arizona 85007 - (800) 253-0883Governor's Regulatory Review Council
100 N.15th Avenue Suite 402, Phoenix, AZ 85007 - (602) 542-2058Attorney General Terry Goddard, Office of the Attorney General
1275 West Washington Street, Phoenix, AZ 85007 - 800-352-8431, 800-352-8431Arizona Secretary of State Jan Brewer
1700 West Washington Street, 7th Floor, Phoenix, AZ 85007-2888Senator Robert "Bob" Burns, Vice-Chairman, Accountability and Reform Committee
Arizona State Senate, 1700 West Washington Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85007John Huppenthal, Chairman, Judiciary Committee
Arizona State Senate, 1700 West Washington Street, Room 308, Phoenix, Arizona 85007Dean Martin, Vice_Chairman, Judiciary Committee
Arizona State Senate, 1700 West Washington Street, Room 308, Phoenix, Arizona 85007Jack W. Harper, Judiciary Committee, Arizona State Senate
1700 West Washington Street, Room 301, Phoenix, Arizona 85007Richard Miranda, Judiciary Committee, Arizona State Senate
1700 West Washington Street, Room 304, Phoenix, Arizona 85007Chief Mark Kappelhoff, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Criminal Section, PHB, Washington, D.C. 20530Coordination and Review Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice
Post Office Box 66560, Washington, D.C. 20035-6560 - (202) 307-2222Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, Washington, DC 20530.Office for Civil Rights, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice
633 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Room 1105, Washington, D.C. 20531 - (202) 307-0690